

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 107365
ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NSC-05 ERDA-05 EB-07 OIC-02 CIAE-00
PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15
PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 /072 R

DRAFTED BY OSD:RKOMER:MEM
APPROVED BY EUR/RPM:WTSHINN
DOD:SECY. BROWN
PM/ISP:MMICHAUD
EUR/RPM:WTROBINSON
-----130105Z 081719 /63

O P 122352Z MAY 77 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USLOSACLANT PRIORITY
USDELMC BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 107365

HOLD FOR OPENING OF BUSINESS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO, DPC

SUBJECT: DPC MINISTERIAL - US STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

1. REQUEST AMBASSADOR PROVIDE FOLLOWING TEXT TO DPC
PERMREPS, SECGENERAL LUNS AND CHAIRMAN, MILITARY COMMITTEE
AS AN ADVANCE COPY OF THE STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD WHICH
SECRETARY BROWN WILL SUBMIT TO SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS FOR
THE DPC MINISTERIAL.

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2. TEXT IS CONSISTENT WITH TEXT OF THE BRIEFING BY
AMBASSADOR KOMER FOR DPC PERMREPS, BUT CONTAINS MORE
AMPLIFYING MATERIAL.

3. WE EXPECT SECDEF TO REFER TO HIS SUBMISSION OF HIS
WRITTEN STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD DURING HIS DISCUSSION OF
THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM AND SHORT-TERM MEASURES
DURING THE RESTRICTED SESSION.

4. PURPOSE OF ADVANCE CIRCULATION OF THIS STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD IS TO FACILITATE MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION AND ACTION ON THE US DEFENSE INITIATIVES.

5. BEGIN TEXT.

PROPOSED US DEFENSE INITIATIVES

AS PRESIDENT CARTER STRESSED AT THE LONDON MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, THE US BELIEVES THAT BOTH SHORT-TERM AND LONGER-TERM MEASURES AIMED AT VISIBLE STRENGTHENING OF NATO'S DETERRENT/DEFENSE POSTURE SHOULD BE HIGH ON OUR AGENDA AS NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS. WE DO NOT BY ANY MEANS DENIGRATE THE SIGNIFICANT ONGOING NATO EFFORTS, BUT SUGGEST THAT THEY NEED TO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY CERTAIN NEW ALLIANCE INITIATIVES. IN OUR VIEW, THEREFORE, DEFENSE MINISTERS SHOULD AGREE TO: (A) A LONG-TERM PROGRAM TO BE DEVELOPED OVER THE NEXT YEAR AND APPROVED IN SPRING 1978; AND (B) A SERIES OF SHORT-TERM MEASURES FOR APPROVAL QTE IN PRINCIPLE UNQTE NOW, WITH DETAILS TO BE DEVELOPED BY THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN CONSULTATION WITH NATIONS, AND FORMAL COMMITMENT TO BE WORKED OUT OVER THE NEXT SIX MONTHS.

A. LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM

THIS PROPOSAL CALLS FOR PREPARATION OF A LONG-TERM
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DEFENSE PROGRAM TO ADAPT NATO'S DETERRENT/DEFENSE POSTURE TO THE NEEDS OF THE 80'S. WHILE A PARTIAL ANALOGY WOULD BE TO NATO'S EARLIER AD-70 AND BASIC ISSUES REPORTS, WE SEE THE NEW PROGRAM AS BEING QUITE DIFFERENT IN APPROACH -- NOT ANOTHER MASSIVE PAPER EXERCISE, BUT MORE OF AN ACTION PROGRAM TO MEET THE OBJECTIVE ALREADY BEING DEFINED.

-- THE BASIC PURPOSE WOULD BE TO FOLLOW UP THE 1977 MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE. WE THINK SOMETHING ELSE BEYOND NATO'S BIENNIAL FORCE GOALS EXERCISE IS NEEDED TO RESPOND ADEQUATELY TO THIS NEW GUIDANCE. WE HAVE IN MIND SUPPLEMENTING, NOT DUPLICATING OR SUPPLANTING, ONGOING NATO FORCE PLANNING AND NATIONAL PROGRAMS.

-- WE SEE NO NEED TO REVIEW THE THREAT OR NATO'S BASIC STRATEGY, WHICH ARE ALREADY COVERED IN MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE - 1977 AND OTHER CURRENT DOCUMENTS. WE ENVISAGE BUILDING ON THIS NEW MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE TO DEVELOP AN AGREED LONG-TERM PROGRAM DESIGNED TO CARRY IT OUT IN AS SPECIFIC AND PROGRAMMATIC TERMS AS NATIONS CAN AGREE UPON.

-- WE SUGGEST CONCENTRATING ON A LIMITED NUMBER OF HIGH PRIORITY AREAS WHERE COLLECTIVE ACTION IS URGENTLY REQUIRED AND WHERE MINISTERIAL DIRECTION IS NEEDED. OUR OWN IDEA OF THESE PRIORITY AREAS COINCIDES RATHER CLOSELY WITH THAT OF THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

-- WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING AREAS AS WORTH SPECIAL TREATMENT:

1. GREATER READINESS -- PARTICULARLY AGAINST SHORT-WARNING ATTACK. FORTUNATELY, NATO'S NEED IS NOT SO MUCH FOR MORE FORCES AS FOR BETTER MANAGED, BETTER EQUIPPED, MORE COMPATIBLE, AND READIER FORCES. CLEARLY ONE OF ITS HIGHER PRIORITIES MUST BE READINESS TO DETER AND IF
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NECESSARY COPE WITH A SHORT-WARNING ATTACK.

2. QUICKER AND MORE EFFECTIVE REINFORCEMENT AND RESERVE MOBILIZATION -- TO HELP MEET THE RISK OF SHORT WARNING ATTACK, AS WELL THAT OF A FULLY DEVELOPED ATTACK.

3. RATIONALIZATION, ESPECIALLY INTEROPERABILITY/ STANDARDIZATION AND HARMONIZATION OF ARMAMENTS DESIGN AND PRODUCTION. RATIONALIZATION, INCLUDING FLEXIBILITY IN USE OF FORCES, IS VITAL AT LEAST AS MUCH ON GROUNDS OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AS OF COST-REDUCTION.

4. STRENGTHENING NATO'S MARITIME POSTURE. WE NEED TO PRESS FORWARD WITH MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS, WHILE ENSURING INTEROPERABILITY OF OUR FORCES AT SEA.

5. AIR DEFENSE (WHICH THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, SACEUR AND THE CNAD ALL URGE BE DEALT WITH IN A BROAD FRAME RATHER THAN PIECEMEAL). SINCE FUTURE MAJOR SYSTEMS WILL LIKELY BE VERY EXPENSIVE, WE NEED A COMMON FAMILY OF SAMS AND GUNS FOR AFFORDABILITY'S SAKE ALONE.

6. COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL (C3), WHICH SACLANT AND SACEUR TERM OF VERY HIGH PRIORITY. THIS IS CENTRAL TO THE INTEGRATED YET FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF NATO'S DISPARATE NATIONAL FORCES IN COALITION WAR. C 3 CAN BE A GREAT FORCE MULTIPLIER.

7. CONSUMER LOGISTICS, INCLUDING ADEQUATE WRM STOCKS. WE MUST SEEK A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN TRADITIONAL NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MULTINATIONAL MEASURES TO ASSURE ADEQUATE FLEXIBILITY AND PERMIT QUICK RESPONSE.

8. ELECTRONIC WARFARE, WHERE THE ALLIANCE IS HIGHLY VULNERABLE.

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9. PERHAPS THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION, WHICH SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE NPG.

WE SEE SUCH PROBLEM AREAS AS REQUIRING ADDITIONAL ACTION TO SUPPLEMENT NATO'S CURRENT DEFENSE PLANNING CYCLE IN THREE SIGNIFICANT WAYS:

1. MANY ASPECTS OF THESE PRIORITY AREAS NEED TO BE ADDRESSED IN A LONGER TIMEFRAME THAN 1979-84. IN SOME CASES, NATO MIGHT HAVE TO LOOK OUT 10-12 YEARS, PARTICULARLY IN ORDER TO HARMONIZE R&D AND DEFENSE PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS, AS IS SO IMPORTANT. FOR EXAMPLE, IF WE SEEK MORE OF A TWO-WAY STREET IN COOPERATIVE DEFENSE PROCUREMENT, WE MUST PLAN WELL AHEAD FOR IT.

2. THESE PRIORITY AREAS SEEM TO US TO REQUIRE A HIGH DEGREE OF ALLIANCE COOPERATION THROUGH JOINT PROGRAMS, WHICH ARE HARD TO FIT INTO THE FORCE GOALS FORMAT (E.G., RATIONALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION, INTEROPERABILITY, SPECIALIZATION, CONSUMER LOGISTICS). SUCH ISSUES CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSED IN A LONG-TERM PROGRAM.

3. THESE PRIORITY AREAS ALSO REQUIRE STRENGTHENED PROGRAMMING AND IMPLEMENTING MACHINERY TO HELP DESIGN COMMON PROGRAMS AND TO INSURE THAT AGREED PLANS ARE ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT IN PRACTICE. WE FEEL THIS NEED SHOULD BE ASSESSED IN THE COURSE OF DEVELOPING THE PROPOSED LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM.

THE END PRODUCT WE FORESEE WOULD BE A SERIES OF SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, WITH NATIONAL AND COLLECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS SPELLED OUT IN AS PROGRAMMATIC TERMS AS FEASIBLE, COMMON IMPLEMENTING MACHINERY SUGGESTED, AND PRIORITY AND TIME PHASING LAID OUT. SUCH AGREED PROGRAMS WOULD PROVIDE THE DEFENSE MINISTERS WITH IMPROVED MEANS OF FOLLOWING THROUGH COLLECTIVELY ON WHAT IS NEEDED, GENERATING SUITABLE
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NATIONAL RESPONSES AND GUIDING RELATED NATO INTEGRATED OR COLLECTIVE ACTION. EACH INDIVIDUAL PROGRAM WOULD IDENTIFY ALL ACTIONS NEEDED.

SINCE IT IS QUITE IMPORTANT THAT THIS EXERCISE BE LAUNCHED WITHOUT DELAY, I SUGGEST THAT WE, IN OUR PRESENT MINISTERIAL MEETING, DIRECT THE DPC IN PERMANENT SESSION TO

BEGIN ACTUAL WORK THIS SPRING. NATO'S OWN CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD PREPARE THE LONG-TERM PROGRAM, AIDED IF NECESSARY BY EXPERTS FROM NATIONS.

1. BOTH NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN PROPOSING WHAT THEY SEE AS NEEDED IN THE KEY PRIORITY AREAS CHOSEN, INCLUDING WHAT NATO MACHINERY IS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT COMMON PROGRAMS.

2. THEN, THE DPC IN PERMANENT SESSION WOULD ADDRESS THESE NEEDS IN TERMS OF HOW BEST TO MEET THEM, INCLUDING PROPOSALS FOR SUCH COMMON AND COLLEGIAL PROGRAMS AND STRENGTHENING OF NATO IMPLEMENTING MACHINERY AS ARE REQUIRED TO INSURE THAT NEEDED COOPERATIVE MEASURES CAN BE EFFECTIVELY CARRIED OUT AND THAT ALL ACTIONS ARE EFFECTIVELY MONITORED.

3. PERHAPS A BODY UNDER DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL CHAIRMANSHIP COULD SERVE AS A STEERING COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE EXERCISE AND REVIEW PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS RECOMMENDING ACTION BY THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE WHERE NEEDED AND ACTING FOR THE DPC WHEN SO EMPOWERED.

4. WE DO NOT SEE ALL OF THE PROGRAM AREAS AS NECESSARILY BECOMING RIPE FOR ACTION AT THE SAME TIME. AS PRESIDENT CARTER SAID, "...DIFFICULT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS...SET PRACTICAL LIMITS." BUT WE NEED TO IDENTIFY WHAT ACTIONS NEED TO BE TAKEN IN THE MID AND LONGER TERM AND WHAT STUDIES NEED TO BE UNDERTAKEN, SO THAT PRIORITIES CAN BE
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SET AND ASSETS CAN BE PROPERLY USED UNDER AN AGREED PHASING.

5. THE FINAL REPORT WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO MINISTERS AT THE SPRING 1978 DPC, AFTER AN INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT IN DECEMBER. AS PRESIDENT CARTER HAS SUGGESTED, IT MIGHT THEN BE PRESENTED TO OUR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT ANOTHER NAC SUMMIT MEETING.

B. SHORT-TERM MEASURES

IN ADDITION TO THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM JUST OUTLINED, WE SEE A NEED FOR A FEW MODEST SHORT-TERM MEASURES, AS A DESIRABLE RESPONSE TO THE SUMMIT MEETING IN ORDER TO:
(1) IMPART A SENSE OF EARLY FORWARD MOVEMENT TOWARD IMPROVEMENT OF NATO'S DEFENSE READINESS, INSTEAD OF ONLY PROPOSING A LONG-TERM PROGRAM; AND (2) GENERATE SOME VISIBLE NATO-WIDE ACTIONS TO PARALLEL INCREASED US DEFENSE CONTRIBUTIONS (IN RESPONSE TO VICE-PRESIDENT MONDALE'S CALL FOR THE ALLIES TO JOIN US IN RISING TO THE CHALLENGE).

WE SUGGEST THESE CRITERIA FOR SUCH INITIATIVES:

1. THE CRITERION OF BEING ECONOMICALLY SUSTAINABLE--
WE ENVISAGE THESE INITIATIVES AS MODEST IN TERMS OF FUNDING
REQUIRED, SO AS TO BE WELL WITHIN THE SHORT-RUN POLITICAL-
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS WHICH AFFECT ALL OF US. SOME MAY
BE FEASIBLE BY TRADE-OFFS OR REPROGRAMMING.

2. THESE INITIATIVES SHOULD RESPOND TO A FEW SELECTED
HIGH PRIORITY NMA REQUIREMENTS.

3. THE MEASURES IDENTIFIED SHOULD BE FULLY CONSISTENT
WITH THE NEW MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE; INDEED THEY SHOULD BE
REGARDED AS AN INTERIM RESPONSE TO IT. WE ARE NOT
UNMINDFUL OF THE RECENT AND CURRENT IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO
DEFENSE. NEVERTHELESS, MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE MAKES IT
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CLEAR THAT ADDITIONAL EFFORT IS NEEDED.

FIRST, WE SUGGEST A SHORT-TERM EFFORT TO BRING CRITICAL
ANTIARMOR HOLDINGS UP TO A MINIMAL ACCEPTABLE LEVEL, TO
BE RECOMMENDED BY THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. ANTI-
ARMOR HAS LONG BEEN A HIGH NATO PRIORITY. WE PROPOSE
DPC MINISTERIAL AGREEMENT TO: (A) TASK THE NMAS TO
RECOMMEND WITHIN 30 DAYS INTERIM GROUND ANTIARMOR IMPROVE-
MENT OBJECTIVES BY NATION; AND (B) MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO
MEET THESE OBJECTIVES BY SOME SPECIFIC EARLY DATE, SUCH
AS END-1978, REPORTING THEIR GOVERNMENTS' INTENTIONS TO
THE DPC NEXT DECEMBER. BY WAY OF EXAMPLE, NATO MIGHT SET
AN INTERIM RECOMMENDED LEVEL OF ATGM LAUNCHERS PER DIVISION.
WE RECOGNIZE THAT IN RECENT YEARS SEVERAL NATO NATIONS
HAVE IMPROVED THEIR ANTIARMOR SYSTEMS, BUT IN SOME
INSTANCES SHORTFALLS REMAIN EVEN WHEN PROCUREMENT PLANS
ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

SECOND, WE SUGGEST A SIMILAR INITIATIVE TO REDUCE AT
LEAST MODESTLY ANOTHER LONGSTANDING KEY DEFICIENCY --
THAT IN WAR RESERVE MUNITIONS. SHAPE IS SCHEDULED TO
COMPLETE NEW CONSUMPTION RATES IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.
WE SHOULD EACH RESOLVE TO COMPLETE NATIONAL REVIEW OF
THESE NEW STANDARDS WITHIN 60 DAYS SO THAT THEY CAN BE
FORMALLY APPROVED BY DECEMBER 1977 AND NATIONAL PROGRAMMING
CAN BEGIN FOR THEIR FULFILLMENT. HERE AS WELL, THE
MINISTERS COULD: (A) TASK THE NMAS TO RECOMMEND WITHIN
30 DAYS A FEW SELECTED HIGH CONSUMPTION MUNITIONS FOR
INTERIM ACTION; AND (B) MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MEET THESE
OBJECTIVES BY A SPECIFIC DATE LIKE END-1978, REPORTING
THEIR INTENTIONS NEXT DECEMBER. FOR INSTANCE, NATO
MIGHT CALL FOR BRINGING AMMUNITION FOR 155 MM HOWITZERS
AND 105 MM ANTITANK GUNS UP TO 30 DAYS; AIM-9 ALSO COULD

BE BROUGHT UP TO 30 DAYS.

THIRD, WE SUGGEST THE SAME PROCEDURE BE FOLLOWED ON A
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FEW CRITICAL READINESS AND REINFORCEMENT DEFICIENCIES,
WITH THE MINISTERS AGAIN AGREEING TO TASK THE NMAS TO
PREPARE SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS WITHIN 30 DAYS AND

NATIONS SIGNIFYING THEIR RESPONSES AT THE DECEMBER
MINISTERIAL MEETING. WE HAVE IN MIND SUCH MEASURES AS
REDUCING DEPLOYMENT TIMES, IMPROVING RESERVE FORCES,
SCHEDULING FASTER MOBILIZATION OF CIVIL TRANSPORTATION
CAPACITY, AND PROVIDING NECESSARY RECEPTION FACILITIES
FOR REINFORCEMENT.

C. CONCLUDING REMARKS

AS WE SEE IT, SUCH A PACKAGE OF SHORT-TERM INITIATIVES,
PROBABLY DRAWN LARGELY FROM SACLANT'S AND SACEUR'S FLEXI-
BILITY AND FORCE PROPOSALS, WOULD NEATLY COMPLEMENT THE
LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM EXERCISE BY DEMONSTRATING FOR-
WARD MOVEMENT TOWARD MEETING SOME OF NATO'S MOST CRITICAL
DEFENSE DEFICIENCIES.

I BELIEVE THAT WE THE NATO ALLIES MUST COLLEGIALLY
DEMONSTRATE THIS DEGREE OF PROMPT RESPONSIVENESS TO THE
MANDATE GIVEN TO US BY OUR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT THE
NATO SUMMIT LAST WEEK. IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY AS WELL AS
A CHALLENGE. BUT MORE THAN THIS, I BELIEVE THAT BOTH
THE GROWTH IN WARSAW PACT OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND
THE QUITE SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES WITHIN OUR OWN ALLIANCE,
BY THEMSELVES DICTATE A NEW DEMONSTRATION OF COLLECTIVE
DETERMINATION TO RESOLVE THE MANY PROBLEMS WE CONFRONT.
I SEE THESE SHORT AND LONGER TERM INITIATIVES AS
IMPORTANT TO THIS END. THE INCREASED MILITARY CAPABILITY
RESULTING FROM SUCH INITIATIVES COULD WELL BE VITAL. BUT
EVEN IF THIS CAPABILITY IS NEVER CALLED ON, THE POLITICAL
COHESION WE CAN DEMONSTRATE BY ACHIEVING IT WILL CARRY
ITS OWN MESSAGE TO OTHERS.

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THE UNITED STATES WILL BE PROGRESSIVELY REVAMPING ITS
OWN PROCEDURES TO PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS UPON CONTRI-
BUTING TO A BALANCED COALITION POSTURE WHICH CAN CARRY
OUT EFFECTIVELY IN PRACTICE THE COALITION STRATEGY TO
WHICH WE ALL ADHERE. BUT THIS CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED -- AT

A COST WE CAN SUSTAIN-- BY THE COMBINED EFFORTS OF US
ALL. THUS, I WISH TO UNDERLINE THE KEY POINT JUST MADE
AT THE SUMMIT BY OUR PRESIDENT -- WE AMERICANS ARE READY
AND WILLING TO DO MORE, BUT WE COUNT ON PARALLEL
CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION BY OUR FELLOW ALLIES.

CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ALLIANCE, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, BRIEFING MATERIALS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 12-May-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE107365
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: OSD:RKOMER:MEM
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770168-0430
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197705110/baaaevwx.tel
Line Count: 389
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 1aa96088-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16-Dec-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2345391
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DPC MINISTERIAL - US STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
TAGS: MPOL, US, NATO, DPC
To: NATO INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/1aa96088-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009